Honda cbr500r exhaust upgrade

I posted this long multi-comment thread on the megathread last Sunday, and several people suggested that I make it its own post, so here goes. Note this post is lightly edited from the original comment to improve readability and preserve some arguments made by another commenter in that thread without me having to do the hard work of editing the whole post to reflect their well-taken counterpoints. For those who read the original, it hasn't changed in any significant way except that one link. This post is largely my own analysis supported by links to a variety of credible sources.
Dr. Sovietlove; or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bakhmut
Many people on the daily megathread or on Twitter have been arguing that holding out in Bakhmut has caused enormous and unsustainable Ukrainian losses which will compromise their future offensive potential, and/or that Soviet-style leadership is the only reason the Ukrainians have held on to Bakhmut for so long. Much like during the Battle of Severodonetsk, I think a lot of people are overreacting to events in the Donbas and that the Ukrainians might have a perfectly reasonable strategic justification for continuing to defend Bakhmut. I have a few hypotheses about the situation and put together some analysis and sources to support those conclusions below.
My hypotheses in brief:

1. Ukraine effectively has two armies, one post-Soviet and one NATO. UAF high commmand has recognized that they have to fight the Russians with an only partially modernized military which includes significant numbers of officers, soldiers, and equipment not suitable for NATO-style warfare. They recognize that you can't "beat a large Soviet army with a small one." They have therefore formulated a strategy to use the post-Soviet and NATO-style units where their particular strengths are most relevant, and are largely resourcing and employing them separately as a result.
2. The UAF is aggressively applying economy of force principles, which dictate that an army should devote the maximum amount of resources to their primary effort, while allocating the smallest amount possible to any secondary efforts. Thus, the Ukrainians are committing the fewest possible resources to holding the line of contact in the Donbas while reserving as much as possible for their primary effort, which is the coming counteroffensive.
3. Ukraine along with their allies and soft power proxies such as friendly journalists, whether knowingly or not, have been engaged in a disinformation campaign designed to lure Putin into committing the last of his mobilized reserves to an assault on Bakhmut in the last days of the mud season before the Ukrainian spring counteroffensive.

I'd like to emphasize that these are assessments backed by analysis and facts which you can check yourself below, but are definitely not by any means 100% certain.
Two Armies
The post-Soviet army can be characterized by its leadership, organization, and resources.

• Leaders tend to be older senior officers trained under Soviet regime pre-2014, although the culture also pervades lower ranks (although that is unsurprising given leadership influence). These officers are often difficult to retrain in the field, tend to punish rather than encourage junior officer initiative, and prefer top-down command-and-control style.
• These units include many irregular formations, e.g. TDF and National Guard. Of the regular army units in this mold, they tend to be those low on the priority list for upgrades, e.g. motorized brigades that haven't been uparmored to mech brigades yet, and/or ones with the largest proportion of Soviet-derived equipment.
• Many such units are organized as light infantry, typically either motorized or TD brigades, sometimes airmobile. So not much armor or IFVs, unlike what is seen with the regular army mech brigades. Instead they largely rely on many of the thousands of IMVs and APCs donated by western allies for some amount of armored mobility.
• Much less training than regular army in some cases. In the first few days of the war, many of these units were literally just the volunteers that showed up and were handed rifles with no questions asked.
• More conscripts and fewer volunteers being used to provide replacements for these units.
• Fewer professional military officers. Hence reports like this one about an officer seeing 100% turnover in his battalion until he was the only professional officer left.

These units are generally not going to be as useful for offensives, but are certainly capable of holding a fortified defensive line, albeit likely at dreadfully high cost in some cases. Light infantry are surprisingly resilient to artillery fire when dug in properly, and so are an effective check against the (apparently declining) Russian artillery advantage. ATGMs and mines also make it possible for them to resist all but the most carefully coordinated combined arms assaults, which are a vanishingly rare occurence coming from the RuAF. And these units were relatively cheap to equip and quick to train. So they are well-suited for countering the three primary Russian numerical advantages in artillery, armor, and raw manpower, at least while fighting defensively in prepared positions.
On the other hand, their NATO-style forces are better suited for combined arms maneuver warfare and thus offensives. They emphasize distributed decision making, tactical flexibility, and robust communications between different units and levels of the command. That enables flexible coordination of multiple capabilities on the attack, such that defending against one capability makes defending against the others harder. e.g. suppressing entrenched infantry with artillery while mechanized units traverse open killing ground during an assault in order to bring their tank and IFV guns to bear on those infantry to suppress them after the artillery lets up. Ukraine is in the process of building out or deploying around 20-28 new brigades of this type. I feel a little bad sourcing to a comment from this megathread rather than a credible third-party source, but offogredux puts together truly excellent summaries of the current structure of Ukrainian forces, so why reinvent the wheel? Plus their information matches what I've seen elsewhere, including the less consolidated information available here on militaryland. Notably, some units are being built around smaller veteran battalion- or regiment-sized separate units that are upsized to brigades, while others are entirely new formations, but likely include substantial numbers of veteran leaders at all levels.
Ok, so where is this "NATO" army?
There are reports of extreme deficits of NATO-trained personnel at the front, which are typically presented as a sign of Ukrainian weakness (n.b., see below for more on why to treat any Ukrainian-sourced reports of Ukrainian weakness with a healthy dose of skepticism). Often sources attribute the deficit to high casualty rates among those personnel during the earlier stages of the war. Best estimates are that the Ukrainians have lost around 120k soldiers. They started the war with around 250k personnel, of whom perhaps 20k were US-trained veterans.
Since then, the UK, EU, and US have trained something like an additional 20k+ soldiers (possibly with some overlap with the other 20k, but likely insignificant numbers if so), with plans to expand training for tens of thousands of additional troops over the next year. So even if every single one of the pre-war NATO-trained personnel are casualties, the total number of NATO-trained personnel in the UAF has at worst remained constant, at best it has doubled, and in any case it will only continue to grow as the western training programs ramp up and the Ukrainians disseminate those skills by assigning NATO-trained personnel to their own training centers. (Note: when I first posted this, VigorousElk made an excellent counter-argument to this point here which is worth considering and I didn't want to cut out of the conversation by moving this to a text post. I don't think it undermines the overall thrust of the argument, though.)
However, the overall proportion of NATO-trained personnel in the UAF has almost certainly declined because mobilization has likely increased the total size of their forces by more than a factor of two, so the overall proprtion declined even if the total number of NATO-trained soldiers actually did double (which is very, very doubtful and the 40k number should be treated as an extremely loose upper bound). That proportion is probably even lower on the front lines if the UAF have allocated those soldiers to new unit formation and units held in reserve for the upcoming offensive. So even if the Ukrainians haven't experienced particularly high casualty rates among such soldiers, we should expect to see far fewer of them on the lines right now. Meaning we can't infer the execess casualty rate from the composition of front line units, as many commentators have, nor do we need a particularly high casualty rate to explain why there are so few of them at the front. Just the formation of so many new brigades must have sucked up all of the available experienced junior officers and NCOs, especially if the UAF are trying to concentrate NATO-trained personnel into specific units. Again that doesn't mean they haven't experienced high casualties, just that the issue probably isn't as bad as some of these articles have made out.
I suspect some of the authors of these articles have taken that position because of selection bias, e.g., Franz-Stefan Gad, who visited the front near Bakhmut with Michael Kofman recently. If you are only visiting the units that are intentionally being staffed with fewer NATO-trained personnel, you shouldn't be surprised to see fewer NATO-trained personnel. Their absence doesn't indicate permanent backsliding across the entire UAF, demonstrate the incompetence of the Ukrainians, nor prove that the Ukrainians have suffered anything near 100% casualties among their NATO-trained NCOs. Instead, it just reflects the relative prioritization of scarce resources by UAF command. In a recent War on the Rocks podcast episode, Kofman specifically pointed out that his visit (and by extension his companions' visits) did not involve any kind of general or systematic survey of the Ukrainian forces, and so any conclusions based on his observations should not be taken to be totally representative of what is happening across the entire UAF right now.
Cool. Where are the "Soviet" units then?
It helps to put yourself in Zaluzhny's shoes here. You have two big chunks of your armed forces that operate in very different ways and which are suitable for very different tasks. You are finding it difficult to encourage the newly mobilized senior officers to let go of their Soviet habits, but you also need them because there is no one else who is immediately prepared to lead newly mobilized formations. So you make the obvious, logical decision to use the Soviet-style mobilized commanders how and where you can best make use of them, while hopefully keeping their habits contained and isolated from your more professional units. The best place for those commanders in this war is probably on the defensive in the trenches, where rapid decision-making around complex maneuvers is less often necessary, light infantry can be effective at attriting enemy armored and maneuver forces, individual soldiers don't need as much training to be effective, combined arms operations are less frequent and more easily choreographed, the risk of catastrophic failure is less, and logistics are dramatically simpler than for an offensive force on the move with many vehicles requiring ammo, fuel, and maintenance.
The allocation of armored assets supports this conclusion. Per Oryx, Ukraine has received almost exactly the same number of Soviet-derived tanks from their western partners as they have lost so far in this war (488+ donated Soviet-variant tanks versus around 477 lost). Plus captured Russian equipment, they almost certainly have more armor available now than they did at the beginning of the war, not even taking into account the impending introduction of western tanks. Yet there are reports from the front lines that armor is relatively scarce and lightly used. It seems the UAF have combined multiple brigades into ad hoc corps or divisions along stretches of the line of contact (what Jomini calls a "defensive grouping") to fill in the gap left by the absence of real formations above brigade size in the Ukrainian ground forces TOE.
That grouping often consists of several lighter brigades holding the front line backed by a smaller number of more professionalized and/or heavily armored mech or armor brigades as the reserve. e.g., the UAF defensive grouping around Bakhmut in February, which consisted of two mech brigades backing two TDF brigades, one airmobile brigade, and one marine brigade, all equipped exclusively with Soviet-derived armor and IFVs, along with limited quantities of older western IMVs and APCs like the M113. So light infantry in the trenches, with armor in the rear to plug holes or provide indirect fire support. This approach allows the UAF to allocate the fewest number of regular mechanized and armored army units to the front, freeing up capacity for re-equiping and training for an offensive. It also puts the least amount of strain on their tank and IFV supplies, by making heaviest use of their soon-to-be legacy vehicles, which are also conveniently the ones more Soviet-minded commanders are most familiar with. Hence the relative dearth of armor at the front, even though we should expect more tanks and IFVs than were available at the beginning of the war. The reduced armor commitment comes at the expense of the light infantry in the trenches, who absorb Russian attacks without the benefit of enough tank or IFV support. Further evidence for the idea that lighter forces reliant more on IMVs/APCs form the bulk of forces around Bakhmut includes the UAF charging Russian lines riding M113s in the vicinty of Bakhmut literally yesterday. Which feels a bit like the modern equivalent to the apocryphal story about Polish cavalry charging tanks during WW2, but I guess they have to make do with the tools available.
Does the presence of Soviet-influenced commanders at the front indicate that the decision to hold Bakhmut was made by such officers blindly applying Soviet doctrine? I would argue probably not. Syrsky and Zaluzhny have long-established reputations as very much not that sort of officer, and both have reviewed and approved the decision to hold in Bakhmut. More importantly, and without relying on an appeal to their authority, there are sufficient strategic and operational justifications to continue the defense there, even if it is on less favorable terms than other defensive efforts across the front. Specifically, attriting Russian reserves to reduce their resistance to an offensive, much like what happened in Kharkiv last August.
If attriting Russian reserves is the goal, how can these conscript-heavy formations with Soviet-style leadership best do so?
Right now, Russia only has a single division held in reserve. That would be the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, elements of which have likely been committed to combat already. This reserve exists to exploit any breakthroughs achieved by assaults on the Ukrainian defenses and to plug any holes in the Russian lines resulting from UAF attacks. If the reserve is depleted before the Ukrainian counter-offensive, the UAF will be able to achieve much more progress much more quickly. Once they breach the Russian lines, there is nothing to stop a penetration into operational depths. Even though the Russians have fortified extensive fallback positions on secondary lines throughout occupied Ukraine, they need reserves to hold those lines if the front lines are penetrated and the Russian units there are unable to withdraw to secondary positions in good order. Withdrawal under fire is a challenging task and one for which only the VDV has demonstrated any capacity on the Russian side. There is also no new wave of Russian mobilization yet to provide any further reserves any time in the near future. Thus, the more Russian reserves the UAF can burn through now, the better their chances on the offensive will be.
There's been a lot of talk about the loss ratio between the belligerents and how that ratio makes a retreat from Bakhmut likely necessary, but ultimately the loss ratio matters less than absolute numbers of Russian reserves attrited. Because the Russians are nearly out of reserves, a UAF attrition strategy may tip them into a full-on rout. If the Ukrainian leaders knew objectively they needed to inflict 1000 more casualties on the Russians to achieve victory, it would be worth losing many times as many Ukrainian soldiers to inflict those casualties. Achieving victory is often worth accepting unfavorable loss ratios, otherwise no one would ever go on the offensive. In any case, the friendly-to-enemy casualty ratios are still almost certainly in Ukraine's favor simply because they are defending, and there have been no serious reports at all that suggest any departure from that norm. So we aren't even talking about the Ukrainians suffering an unfavorable loss ratio at all, just a slightly less favorable one when compared to real ratios from different areas of the front or when compared to hypothesized loss ratios at proposed fallback defensive positions. Rob Lee and DefMon thus both make variations of the same error. They failed to compare the loss ratios around Bakhmut to the expected loss ratios for the offensive, because ultimately the Ukrainians face a choice between attriting the Russian reserves around Bakhmut now, or when they are on the offensive.
Why don't the Ukrainians retreat and get an even more favorable ratio in a better position?
First, because the Russian offensive will culminate in Bakhmut (or it already has) and the RuAF will likely enter an operational pause because of depleted offensive power. That pause will likely last longer than the Ukrainians plan to wait for their counterattack. Basically, only the possibility of victory in Bakhmut can induce the Russians to continue wasting their soldiers lives so recklessly before the spring. Second, because the current loss ratios are pretty well understood and relatively predictable, which is not necessarily true if they retreat. Retreating under fire is challenging even for elite units, and results are naturally unpredictable. Assessing the hypothetical defensibility of any fallback positions is also challenging, especially with sufficient accuracy to be able to meaningfully predict what kind of loss ratio improvements you might gain from repositioning. Third--and this reason is entirely hypothetical--it is possible that the Ukrainians have sufficient intelligence about Russian reserves to know exactly how long they need to hold out, and so perceive the hopefully quite proximate end to a battle that appears to us as outsiders as a limitless meatgrinder that will continue to waste Ukrainian lives indefinitely into the far future. Essentially, they know the price they are paying and what they are getting for it more precisely than we do.
In contrast, on the offensive, the UAF will likely experience a loss ratio that favors the Russians, even if the offensive is generally successful. The exchange in Bakhmut will be particularly favorable if they are able to trade less well-trained conscript formations for the few remaining high quality Russian formations such as Wagner's assault units and the remnants of the VDV. Notably the VDV played a critical role in holding the line in Kherson and delaying the UAF's offensive there until the successful Russian withdrawal across the Dnipro, and it seems reasonable that the Ukrainians don't want to see a repeat delay that may buy time for subsequent waves of Russian force generation. Bottom line, the Ukrainians need to fight these Russian reserves no matter what, and it will nearly always be more favorable to fight them on the defensive than offensive. The challenge with fighting them on the defensive is that the Russians need to agree to go on the offensive first, which means the Ukrainians need to fool the Russians into thinking an attack benefits their strategic objectives. Blessedly, the "we are lucky they are so fucking stupid" guy continues to be the reigning champ of summarizing this war in a single laconic sentence and the Russians have been willing to oblige the Ukrainians with attacks all throughout the mud season.
But by "fool the Russians", I really mean fool Putin. He is micromanaging the war, even dictating decisions at the level of colonels or brigadiers such as when to commit reserves, and that likely includes the much more momentous decision to commit the very last of their available combat reserves. He has repeatedly pushed the RuAF to make objectively poor military decisions for political purposes, and he does not receive reliable information, because he has reduced his circle of confidants to only a couple of advisors who largely tell him what he wants to hear and he does little to gather his own independent information.
Putin is also a classic bully in the distinctive style of the KGB, as Yale professor of history Timothy Snyder describes in an interview here. Their method is always to look for an opponent's weaknesses, and then to ruthlessly expand and exploit those weaknesses. Probably worth mentioning that Timothy Snyder has met with and advised Zelensky directly, so his views aren't just an academic theory, they reflect and influence the views of the actual Ukrainian decisionmakers. Those decisionmakers clearly understand that Putin's instinct is to attack weakness with maximum force, and therefore carefully shape perceptions of Ukrainian weakness to mislead Putin into attacking the wrong targets. I mean, it's pretty widely accepted that the Ukrainains signal weakness intentionally when trying to attract western support, so why should it be surprising that they apply the same techniques to deceiving Putin?
And that is also another reason why the Ukrainians can't just throw their best troops into the battle. If there were no weakness around Bakhmut, the Russians would simply stop attacking with those critically valuable remaining high quality VDV formations.
What weaknesses should the Ukrainians use to mislead Putin?
Putin is not an idiot, so the UAF can't simply invent weaknesses out of thin air. Instead, they have to find ways to exaggerate some real weaknesses while downplaying others. In this case, I think they are combining their very real Soviet-hangover leadership weakness with their related difficulties around conscription to lure the Russians into attacking Bakhmut under unfavorable conditions. Specifically, I am referring to the stories around conscription problems which imply manpower deficits across the board for the UAF and stories suggesting the defense of Bakhmut will compromise future UAF counteroffensives. Playing up those particular weaknesses presents an ideal picture to appeal to Putin's prejudices and his desperation for a politically palatable conclusion to the hostilities. If you blame Soviet-style leadership, it makes the Ukrainians look dumb and incompetent for not retreating, and suggests they remain saddled by the same legacy that has so limited Russian military capabilities during this war, which plays to Putin's belief in Russian superiority. It also suggests to Putin that not only can he achieve the minimally viable political victory he so desperately needs by taking Bakhmut, he can also compromise the Ukrainian ability to conduct future counteroffensives with the very same blow, opening the way for a negotiated settlement that freezes the current lines (plus/minus changes around Bakhmut). It's really the best remaining even theoretically conceivable outcome for Putin, and many of the recent stories and leaks from Ukrainian-aligned media seem perfectly crafted to suggest continuing to attack Bakhmut could very well achieve that outcome. Suspiciously perfect, I would argue.
There have been few reports of widespread difficulty around draft dodging in Ukraine until quite recently, well into the battle for Bakhmut, when suddenly a flood of stories appeared in the media about people avoiding conscription and Ukrainian officials aggressively conscripting people against their will, e.g. from the Economist and Newsweek. Which struck me as odd, considering that the Ukrainians have more than a million reservists and earlier in the war had far more volunteers than capacity to train them for at least the first six months of the war. Even as recently as December, Zaluzhny said that the UAF does not have manpower issues so much as a need for armor and munitions. So where are the volunteers, why are the units around Bakhmut being reinforced with untrained conscripts, and why all the news stories about aggressive conscription? My hypothesis is that the volunteers are funneled into the more NATO-style units, most of which are currently in reserve or training behind the lines, while the Soviet-influenced commanders are given conscripts (at least as a preference if not as a hard rule) and are burning through them faster than other units, mostly in the Donbas meat grinders around Avdiivka and Bakhmut. The prioritization of allocating volunteers to the more NATO-oriented units makes a lot of sense in that context. Mission command requires motivation and self-direction, which you are more likely to find in volunteers. Conscripts can perform at wildly varying levels, and generally can't be relied on as much to take initiative, and so are a better fit for the top-down Soviet command style. This preference or bias could also come about naturally because of self-sorting, as more Soviet-style commanders may be more willing to take on reluctant conscripts than more NATO-oriented leaders, and older officers steeped in Soviet doctrine will have more relevant experience for leading formations with older Soviet kit.
If that's how recruits are being allocated, it explains some of the resistance to conscription, because conscripts are disproportionately funneled straight into the meat grinder by default. For example, the story that has made the rounds of a soldier who received only five days of training before being deployed to Bakhmut. That soldier's experience doesn't mean the regular army volunteer units are having difficulty filling out their TOE or training their soldiers, just that some of the units most reliant on conscripts are. Notably his formation was the 101st Brigade for the Protection of the General Staff, which may be just about the most irregular unit in the entire UAF command structure, outside whatever chaos-demon worship seems to be happening over in the Ministry of Interior. The 101st is actually directly part of the General Staff, rather than assigned to an operational command, unlike every single other combat unit in the regular army.
So I don't know that his experience can be considered particularly representative, although it very well might be for conscripts with the bad luck of ending up in a Soviet-style unit that also happens to be committed to intense combat operations. But that's not all the units by a long shot. It's likely that for every soldier like that around Bakhmut, there are multiple comparable conscripts assigned to relatively quiet or less intense AOs where they are given the opportunity to learn some basic military skills on the job from the more senior members of their unit. So this would actually be a good way to increase their training pipeline, if somehow they could both predict where attacks would come with 100% certainty to avoid allocating untrained conscripts there and yet still somehow need to maintain high force density throughout the front, which seem like mutually contradictory propositions. It's a morally questionable but potentially effective technique for growing the training pipeline if they allocate excess untrained conscripts evenly across the front without regard to the risk that they will be thrown into combat unprepared, which this story seems to suggest may be their practice. It would also be an excellent way to make use of excess conscripts who were recruited primarily to mislead Russia about the level of manpower issues the UAF are experiencing, too.
This strategy of allocating resources across units suggests losses around Bakhmut won't compromise any offensive, because the offensive units are drawing on entirely different recruitment streams, training resources, and equipment types than the defensive units are. The conscript-heavy formations on the frontline at this very moment are serving to absorb Russian attacks and burn through Russian reserves while the more professional units prepare for an offensive that has the potential to be decisive. If it seems unfair to give worse equipment to the people doing the harder fighting right now, just remember economy of force. Bakhmut is secondary to the offensive. In the longer term, the recruitment challenges won't matter as much once the current Russian reserves are exhausted because the meat grinder will be over, and the UAF will no longer need to feed it. By the time Russia can generate any further forces for their own offensives, the Ukrainians will be over the hump in terms of adopting western tanks, IFVs, and combined arms doctrine and will have slack to retrain the units currently holding the lines to meet the same standards.
But what about the spring offensive?
The only contrary evidence to that assessment are reports, usually sourced from anonymous US or NATO defense officials, that western officials are telling the UAF that defending Bakhmut may compromise their ability to conduct a spring counteroffensive. Which really makes no sense at all to me, based on what formations and equipment types are allocated to Bakhmut. The reports are anonymous and lack any supporting detail beyond the basic claim. As I described above, the units around Bakhmut aren't the kinds of units the Ukrainians are likely to use on an offensive in the near future. I therefore tend to dismiss those anonymous reports as leaks intended to spread disinformation, and in particular to invite the Russians to feel confident in committing their reserves to an attack on Bakhmut.
The Russians (and more to the point Putin) may conclude that it's worth burning through their reserves if doing so compromises the Ukrainian ability to counterattack, and these leaks seem suspiciously well designed to invite that conclusion. If the leaked reports about compromising the offensive were true, they probably would not have been leaked at all, because they reveal an actual Ukrainian weakness in a manner which does nothing to protect that weakness. Contrast that scenario to leaks about the dire need for more long range artillery from about a year ago. Russia could absolutely figure out that the Ukrainians needed better long range fires on its own, so the leaks didn't risk revealing new information, yet did actively invite a solution in the form of western donations. Whereas the leak about Bakhmut (if true) just airs Ukrainian dirty laundry, with no real hope of changing the Ukrainian decision or bringing in additional western support. Meaning, it would be a disloyal leak, of which we have not seen many if any from the US/NATO side during this war (potentially not including the general jockeying between the allies for position around major weapons contributions like tanks). Basically the leak was like saying, "Oh no, Putin, whatever you do please don't attack Bakhmut, anywhere but there!" Something tells me the Ukrainians aren't inclined to give Putin good advice about how to hurt them.
Playing the conscription issues up in the media only serves to draw Russian attention to that weakness, too. So why are the Ukrainians permitting these stories to leak, or at least not taking any measures to limit their impact on the information space? One such story was about a man with no hands being denied an exemption from conscription, despite having been classified officially as permanently disabled for his entire life. It is an insane and ridiculous story of bureaucratic incompetence, which if true I would have expected the Ukrainians to suppress during war time because it makes them look so incompetent (again, note how the whiff of corruption and incompetence appeals to Putin's preconceived notions about Ukrainians) and because it was limited enough in scope that it could have been kept away from western reporters (unlike something as pervasive as widespread resistance to conscription). Instead the story was almost actively promoted by UAF-friendly sources like the Economist, which I believe broke the story originally. The Economist is quite explicitly pro-Ukrainian and is also cozy enough with the Ukrainian leadership to have gotten exclusive in-depth interviews with Zelensky, Zaluzhny, Budanov, Syrsky, and others, some of which I even linked as sources above. So it is out of character for them to publish such a lurid anecdote of Ukrainian incompetence.
On the other hand, if the Ukrainians wanted to convince the Russians that they are having manpower issues, one of the easiest ways to do so would be to send out their recruiters and encourage them to employ excessive aggression. Then to leak, plant, falsify, or simply permit publication of stories about the absurd lengths those officials are going to conscript new troops. The Russians would then pick up on the stories and possibly inaccurately infer manpower deficits. Even if the Russian intelligence agencies interpret the stories differently, Putin is more likely to disregard them and rely on media reports than he would have been in past years, before the FSB's incredibly inaccurate pre-war assessments of Ukraine contributed to his decision to invade. It would not surprise me at all to learn that Putin regularly reviews Russia-related press clippings from the Economist to understand how critical issues are being presented in the western media, even if only as part of a larger security or political briefing packet. In fact it would surprise me if he doesn't review at least a sampling of stories from western media, likely heavily biased toward traditional print media with wide influence like the Economist. Which makes it a viable channel for shaping Putin's perceptions, and the man without hands seems like the perfect attention grabbing detail to make sure he sees that particular story.
So basically, propaganda cuts both ways. We are operating in an information space that is quite intentionally shaped by Ukraine, and so should be careful in our conclusions about what is happening beneath the fog of war. Although, I would suggest that it's probably a good starting assumption that the Ukrainian leaders have not become suddenly much less intelligent or less capable than they have been over the last year of this war. Which isn't to say they are perfect, or that we won't see them lose their edge over time. Just that a sudden, rapid, simultaneous decline in Zaluzhny's, Zelensky's, Syrsky's, Budanov's, and the rest of the Ukrainian leadership's intelligence, judgment, and ability would be extremely unlikely. Especially if that decline persisted for a long time, as the decision to hold Bakhmut has, with ample opportunity for correction based on the widespread alarm about UAF losses.

Dealer does not realize you do not adding cost of upgrades to the car, those are lost (I'm a modder so I know). What would you offer for this? KBB says 40K max on private sale. May go for this but looking for opinions. Thanks!
I. Body - Sepang blue (most sought after color) - OEM Euro headlights from Germany (no orange sidelight) - Maxton design front/side splitterear canard - Balance It Tuning rear carbon fiber diffuser - Balance It Tuning rear carbon fiber Spoiler - Revozport vented carbon fiber hood - Wheels/Tires/Brakes - Volk Rays Forged G25 Edge 20x10.5 ET23 - Continental Extreme Contact DSW Oplus tires. - Installed at perfection tire less than a year ago. - Rotora BBK 8 piston FR 6 piston RR (Custom - Powder coated Porsche lime green) - Suspension (Air suspension) - Airlift 3H - (Endo CVT tank) with Viar 444c compressor - Eurocode FRR sway bars - Eurocode FRR adjustable end links - Eurocode Alu Kreuz Drivetrain brace - Canyon Run CR-15 Front strut tower brace
II. Performance - Eventuri carbon fiber intake - AWE track extreme exhaust (includes downpipes) - Custom Carbon fiber steering wheel(Flat bottom) - All OEM buttons work with upgraded steering wheel - Carbon fiber Audi R8 shift paddles - R8 start button - R8 oil and coolant caps - ECS transmission mount bushing - Antigravity lithium battery 15lbs vs. OEM 53lbs - JL Audio 10 inch sub upgrade with the special mat installed to get rid of the annoying vibration(even with the crappy stock sub) the sub upgrade is the only thing the B&O sound system needed. - Upgraded weather tech mats including the trunk Technology package (navigation, Bang and Olefson sound system, voice commands)

So I just finished up Control, and I thought it was pretty fun. I went into it fairly blind and was pleasantly surprised how much I enjoyed it. Telekinesis was insanely fun, combined with levitate make for some great combat along with the other movement abilities.
The gunplay I thought was also very fun, with a lot of ways to shoot people. You effectively had a lot of different weapon types, and ways to transform those weapon types.
I came into this game expecting mediocre combat and a good story, but it came to be the opposite. The combat intrigued me the most, while the story was just serviceable for me. I also thought the gameplay loop of killing stuff, collecting stuff, crafting, upgrading your abilities, was very solid and had a nice flow.
Regarding the story: I enjoyed the mystery of the Bureau. I enjoyed reading everything I could get my hands on. Then suddenly right past half way through the game, I found the lore to be pretty exhausting. Honestly most of the lore in this game is:

• Strange object is an object of power or altered item
• People noted how strange it was
• Bureau steps in and intervenes
• Some comments on it's properties

It was charming at first but then after a while I just didn't care for it at all.
Characters have a slight personality but are basically just quest givers.
We are never given a reason to care about Jessie, or her brother, or anyone, and as I result I felt pretty cold about the world. Everything just felt like merri-go-round of vagueness and by the end of the game I was just exhausted of it. I didn't want the game to necessarily have all the answers for me, it is cosmic horror after all, but I wish the game just came down to reality a little bit instead of meandering into complete lunacy and hallucinations.
Solid 7/10 for me. The atmosphere, gunplay, abilities, were all very fun but slightly repetitive. Story was fine but I never really found it intriguing enough to care much about it. I will probably skip the DLC even though I've heard it was fun. I can understand why this game sort of got overlooked, it's a fairly solid game but ironically it's not really mind blowing in any particular way.

I'm upgrading my current rig and decided on P12s for my intake and my air cooler. My old exhaust fan matched my old set and unfortunately Arctic doesn't seem to make an F12 with RGB to replace it with.
So as the title states I would like a high airflow fan to use as an exhaust. But more importantly I want it to look as close to Arctic's P12 in terms of RGB appearance.
The Phanteks F120SK looks like it would be very similar. But I heard their DRGB doesn't work with standard 12v RGB. So any recommendations are highly appreciated!

Shorter post than usual, and probably a needless one, or at least out of date, but I figured it would be good to get down, “just in case”.
A (thankfully not as common now) misconception is that Spartan III Alpha Company’s destruction was avoidable, that if they had been trained better, equipped better, they might have survived PROMETHEUS. This is refutably false, and this post is intended to demonstrate that their demise was almost completely out of their control, and, primarily, to show that Kurt couldn’t have done anything better to save them.
(Admittedly, there is a bit of theory crafting coming near the end of this post, and I’m not sure if it’s warranted, I wouldn’t mind Haruspis’ comments, if you do see this post, as it seems to be something brought up initially in MJOLNIR and now with SPI. I doubt I’ll get a response though, and I admit I may be making this a bigger issue than it needs to be or is intended to be with its inclusion, but I’m adding it in as another (potential) factor. That’ll be Point III, and clearly labeled as theory crafting.)
With that said, let’s begin with a deep dive into Operation PROMETHEUS:^[1]
PART I: Sent from the sky
The Spartan III program has had more than a few threads made about it to deal with general misconceptions (I think we’re at like, 4 and counting now) so I’ll let those stand.
Alpha Company in general though hasn’t been delved into with much detail. Admittedly we know the least amount of their training, and etc, but we know it was both harder than their predecessors and an improvement of the Spartan II training, or at least, as mentioned by the Encyclopedia, it mirrored it in many ways:

Secretly based on the hidden world of Onyx, the SPARTAN-Ill program was operated and facilitated at Camp Currahee. a military site hidden deep within the planet's dense jungles. Much of the training regimen conducted at Currahee mirrored that of SPARTAN-II training, with intense physical and team-based exercises, as well as an advanced education conducted by an onsite Al.

• Halo Encyclopedia 2022 edition

We know the first night of their training was drastically different from the II’s. The first night of the II’s training is detailed in chapter 3 of The Fall of Reach, the chapter notes the date and time as 2300 hours, September 23rd 2517.
In this chapter Doctor Halsey gives the II’s a speech about why they’re at Reach, why they’ve been chosen, and etc….and then they go to bed.
Chapter 4 begins at 0530 hours, September 24th, 2517, around 6 hours later. The trainees are woken up by stun baton if they didn’t wake by voice alone:

”Wake up, trainee!”
John rolled over in his cot and went back to sleep. He was dimly aware that this wasn’t his room, and that there were other people here.
A shock jolted him—from his bare feet to the base of his spine. He yelled in surprise and fell off the cot. He shook off the disorientation from being nearly asleep and got up.
“I said up, boot! You know which way up is?”
A man in a camouflage uniform stood over John. His hair was shorn and gray at his temples. His dark eyes didn’t look human—too big and black and they didn’t blink. He held a silver baton in one hand; he flicked it toward John and it sparked.
John backed away. He wasn’t afraid of anything. Only little kids were afraid . . . but his body instinctively moved as far away from the instrument as possible.
Dozens of other men roused the rest of the children. Seventy-four boys and girls screamed and jumped out of their cots.

• The Fall of Reach, chapter 4

Comparatively, this is the first thing the III’s of Alpha Company do after their speech by Kurt:

”We cannot accept everyone, though," Kurt continued. "There are five hundred of you. We have three hundred training slots. So tonight. Senior Chief Petty Officer Mendez"—he nodded to the Chief—"has devised a way to separate those who truly want this opportunity from those who do not."
Kurt handed him a tablet reader. "Chief?" To his credit Mendez registered shock for only a split second. He scanned the tablet, frowned, but nodded.
"Yes, sir," he whispered.
Mendez yelled at the children, "You want to be Spartans? Then get back on those ships." They stood shocked, staring at him.
*"No? I guess we found a few washouts. You." He pointed to one child at random. "You. And you." The chosen kids looked at each other, at the ground, and then shook their heads. "No?" Mendez said. "Then get on those Pelicans."
They did so, and so did the others, a slow shuffling procession.
"Drill instructors," Mendez said.
Three dozen NCOs snapped to attention.*
"You will find Falcon Wing aerial descent units on the field. Load them ASAP and make sure your trainees are properly fit-led. Their safe deployment is now your responsibility."
The DIs nodded and ran toward the bundled Falcon Wing backpacks.
The Chief turned back to Kurt. "You're going to make them drop?" He raised both eyebrows in surprise. "At night?"
"The Falcons are the safest drop units," Kurt replied.
"With respect, sir, some of them are only four years old."
"Motivation, Chief. If they can do this, they'll be ready for what we have to put them through.”

• Halo Ghosts of Onyx, chapter 6

Anyone who didn’t jump was disqualified from the program immediately:

A girl with pigtails and missing her front teeth stepped forward. "I'll go first, sir," she yelled.
"Good girl," he said. "Go right to the edge; hang on to the guide line."
She took the tiniest baby steps to the edge of the Pelican, then froze. She took three deep breaths and then with a squeak, she jumped. The wind caught her.
She vanished into the dark.
"Next!" the old Navy man said.
All the kids, Shane included, slowly formed a line. He couldn't believe they were doing this. It was nuts.
The next boy got to the edge, looked down, and screamed. He fell backward, and scrambled away. "No!" he said. "No way!"
"Next!" the man called, and didn't give the kid cowering on the deck another glance.
The next boy jumped without even looking. And the next.

• Halo Ghosts of Onyx, chapter 6

Now, admittedly we don’t know what happened during their first morning, but I’d wager it would have been classroom instruction or some “light” activities. Even so, their first real activity was much more intense than their predecessors.
Their first test, in many respects, mirrored their deployment: dropped into unfamiliar terrain, forced to rely on their equipment and comrades above all else. They rely on each other, on the knowledge that they would not be alone when they reached the ground.
In later, proper, missions, sealed in armour, with the knowledge that their operations had to succeed, the knowledge that they had completed that first jump might have provided some small bit of comfort. If they could do that, maybe they could do anything.
This would be their main method of deployment, using droppods to get deep behind enemy lines, Strike targets of critical opportunity in places others couldn’t reach.
This is presumably how Operation FIREBRAND, IRON GREAVE, and the majority of their other operations were carried out. The standout and exception seems to be Operation HWACHA, which saw Alpha Company operating as boarding and counterboarding teams against Covenant fleet elements in zero-gee.
Whatever the case, the hallmark of a Spartan III deployment in future seemed to be a sudden, abrupt storm of drop pods appearing without warning to those on the ground.
PART II: Nightmares
A big element to why the Alphas seemed to be killed en-masse was, as Kurt puts it, “a loss of unit cohesion”. He notes that, as the battle continued on, Spartan III’s began to drastically deviate from standard formations and understood tactical doctrines. They would go at things alone, or neglect to cover their teammates, or be caught in a bad position that they should have seen and avoided:

The video from a helmet camera showed a dozen SPARTAN-IIIs limping and falling on a smoldering landscape of twisted metal. There was no unit cohesion. No two-man teams covering one another. In the heat-blurred background, Elites took up superior positions with good cover.
This was his fault. He had failed them. His training hadn't prepared them. He should have rectified the flaws in their Mark-I PR suits and fixed them faster.

• Halo Ghosts of Onyx chapter 8

Kurt puts this down to poor training and a lack of upgrades and rectified fixes to their armour (more on this latter point in Part III), and while this is his motivation to push Beta and Gamma harder, I’m not sure it was their training, truncated as it was, that was the cause.
Instead, Halo Oblivion, either intentionally or unintentionally, might give us a reason for why this situation happened:

Altered mental states were a symptom of combat fatigue, especially in exhausted soldiers who were using too many stim-packs in an effort to maintain alertness.
John knew from his combat psychology training back on Reach that too much combat stress could sometimes result in mindless, murderous rages. But such episodes were heat-of-the-moment events that erupted without warning—not carefully prepared actions like the commanders were suggesting now. He turned to Bah’d. “What kind of combat stimulants are you using?”
“Stimulants?” Bah’d narrowed her eyes. “Be careful what you imply, John.”
“Major, I never imply.” John was puzzled by Bah’d’s testy reaction. Stim-packs were standard issue for UNSC special operations troops—who often had to fight for days at a time without sleep—but they were easy to overuse in the heat of a long battle. “Your commanders are focus-locked on a pointless goal. That’s a classic sign of stim-pack overdose.”
The human brain needed sleep to flush out the toxins that accumulated during periods of wakeful activity, and John knew that going even twenty-four hours without rest could lead to concentration and memory problems. After forty-eight hours, the brain started to shut down for microsleeps, which lasted anywhere from half a second to half a minute—all followed by short periods of confusion and disorientation that could prove disastrous in a combat situation. By seventy-two hours, the brain’s toxin load grew so acute that severe lapses in concentration, motivation, and memory were inevitable—and hallucinatory episodes were common.
The only way to counteract the effects of sleep deprivation was to temporarily increase the signal-carrying capacity of the brain’s synapses.
That was how stim-packs worked—and why they were sometimes necessary in combat. If there were natural methods for accomplishing the same thing, John had never heard of them.

• Halo Oblivion, chapter 1

To reiterate, Operation PROMETHEUS occurred from 0700 July 27th to an unspecified hour on August 2nd, or, in short, 7 days, though it was likely much longer, as Alpha Company would have spent hours in Slipspace and free fall before the first Spartan hit the ground.
In terms of hours, that’s 168 hours minimum.
Because of the operation’s location and lack of other UNSC assets in the area, Alpha Company had no safe spaces to hide, or to rest. While it’s possible fireteams took up sentry in “secure” positions, only some of the teams could sleep, and if those members not sleeping were using stim-packs, they might not have been able to sleep once it was their turn. This would undoubtedly cause a rolling, cascading issue as teams were forced to abuse their stims in order to stay awake and functional, but it had the debilitating issue of impacting their higher brain functions.
In the end, the last ones standing were probably so hopped up on stimulants they’d have probably died from cardiac arrest even if they could be extracted.
Comparatively, Covenant forces were constantly rotating in fresh troops as reinforcements were brought in from existing ground units, and then troops stationed in orbit:

"After two days," the Admiral said, "seven rectors were rendered inoperative and a counterforce was finally organized by existing Covenant units."
”The Covenant counterresponse was neutralized," the Rear Admiral continued, "and over the next three days. Alpha Company destroyed thirteen more reactors."
”But," the Rear Admiral said, "a massive counterforce appeared in orbit and descended to the surface."

• Halo Ghosts of Onyx chapter 8

This is, also, not taking into account that the final extraction craft were destroyed by the final day,if not earlier, trapping the Spartans on the asteroid. There was no escape, nowhere to run to, nowhere to go.^[2]
Which is where part III comes in.
Part III: Just because you can, doesn’t mean you should
THIS IS HIGHLY CONJECTURE AND THEORY-CRAFTING, PLEASE NOTE THAT WHEN REFERRING BACK TO THIS SECTION
I’ve been a pretty big proponent of SPI armour over the years, one of the most notable (if not the most notable) on the subreddit, I think (and I don’t make that claim lightly). Admittedly, a lot of that has been via a steady increase of information gathered piece-meal from various sources. If you search up SPI in Halostory’s search bar, a lot of posts with comments will have me in there, defending or clarifying something based off of tthe information we have.
But I might have been misinformed, or at least, misjudged some of the information.
How does this relate to Alpha Company and their deaths? Well, I’ve sort of touched on it above, but this recent canon fodder has sort of cemented the idea in my mind:
SPI has lost its purpose and become the antithesis of what it was meant to be, and in an attempt to make it more interesting, it’s actually been made worse.
That is to say, over the years, we’ve learned that SPI isn’t an individual armour, but a program, a suite, of different armours all under the same umbrella of “Semi-Power-Infiltration”.
It’s noted in a few places (Encyclopedia, Mythos, various Canon Fodders) as being a stable of armour with different variants optimized for different needs. The most recent canon fodder took a look at some of those variants…kind of.
Initially, this might seem like a good thing, giving the armour more variants broadens it’s potential as a warfighting platform, increasing individual operators capabilities and providing synergy amongst team members’ individual specialities, and allows characters who wear it to stand out from one another in visual media (which I personally find rather humorous, considering the Armour’s intended purpose.)
But while it might be a good idea from an artistic standpoint, it’s a very bad idea from a logistical/in-universe one.
The newest canon fodder describes SPI as:

Though not as robust as mainline Mjolnir suits, SPI armor has proven to be an excellent platform for testing a variety of field attachments and upgrades that would be far more costly (and at greater risk of destruction) applied to Spartan-exclusive missions.

• Canon Fodder: New Year, New Lore

It also goes into description of the different appearances we’ve seen over the years. Of particular note is this depiction from Mythos describing Operation PROMETHEUS. (I know, it’s long winded, but we’re finally back on topic).
The canon fodder goes on to say this about the image:

The top-right depiction of Operation: PROMETHEUS—the mission that saw the annihilation of Alpha Company (the first batch of three-hundred Spartan-IIIs)—seen in Halo Mythos likewise showcases two different variants. The central Spartan’s armor is notably more angular, lacking the traditional curves of the “baseline” Mark-I SPI, while the dead Spartan on the ground has a design which conforms more to baseline but has a much thinner “jaw” and lacks defogging vents.

• Canon Fodder: Nee Year, New Lore

Here’s where this is a problem, jotted out for ease of reading:

• You have 300 people sent very far away from any logistics and resupply points, sent to an area surrounded by enemies on all sides.
  
• You have limited space in the drop pods that these 300 people are deployed in. Likely this is filled with weapons, ammunition. Stuff they can carry on their person.
  
• You can send…some number of supply pods (as seen in The Cole Protocol). Larger pods, likely carrying additional explosives, heavy weapons, and, most likely, extra armour to replace damaged ones in the field.
  
• You have these 300 people wearing unique special armour that - to work effectively - must have the plating overlap * perfectly* to achieve proper camouflage. They may all need replacement parts and pieces.
  
• You’ve given some of them unique variants that do not conform to baseline and require different armour plating to work effectively.
  

I think where I’m going with this is obvious.
Their own specializations and uniqueness (seem to have) killed them….or at least could have contributed to their deaths.
If you’ve just been fighting for a day or two, and your team (or several) makes their way to a supply pod full of armour, and you crack it open to find armour pieces for “SPI Mark I Type B” suits…what do you do if you’ve got Type A? The Type B plating won’t work with your armour. Sure, it might “connect” and have the panels activate, but the plating won’t properly fit, it will give you a bad “seal”, and your camouflage capabilities will be compromised. What does this mean? In short, you must isolate yourself from your comrades in order to not give their positions away, but it leaves you vulnerable.
This isn’t like traditional paradrops of today or the past, this armour is fully sealed, it needs to be to function. It is the only thing keeping you alive. The more variation, the harder it is to supply, the harder it is to supply, the more people die.
It’s especially egregious when the differences seem so….minor. It seems almost needless, at least with what we see in Mythos. What benefit did that one more angular variant provide over the usual baseline? What benefit does it give that a supplemental attachment didn’t? Was it worth the trade off for added logistical woes?^[3]
Additionally, though likely not intended (despite actually being noted in several points in the books) any particular variation based off specialty or designation would be a hinderance because it enables enemy commanders and intelligence teams to paint a picture of your capabilities.
If you can figure out that Squad leaders are wearing a particular type of armour, say, CENTURION, all you need to do is (generally speaking) target them, kill them, then kill their second in commands, then in the words of a damn fine soldier, “you can kill any poor bastard you like”.
Anything that makes you look like a more important target makes you a dead target - and for an armour based off stealth and invisibility, that’s a terrible idea.
You would think Kurt noticed this and immediately put a stop to it, because it’s getting his men and women killed…but we can see that it continues to happen in various forms
Admittedly, and to reiterate, this is likely just something we kind of need to accept as necessary for Halo’s visual media and how they’ve decided to design characters, but it still feels noteworthy to mention, especially because characters in universe mention it;^[4]

The second companion made a beeline for Hamm. There was no rank insignia on his armor— it was never smart to help snipers identify high-value targets —but the name stenciled on his breast was CUVIER.
The company captain.
Cuvier stopped halfway between John and Hamm. Nobody saluted, but Hamm stood slightly more erect. Had one of John’s Spartan snipers been an enemy watching through a scope, even the subtle shift of posture would have been enough to get the captain’s helmet blown off.

• Halo Silent Storm 8

.

Jones was only halfway up the side of the hill, but that was high enough to see the top of theopposite hill, and the tiny figures who stood there. Not the Grunts who were running this way and that, not the Jackals who lined the edge of the summit, but the shiny armor of the Elites. Those were the targets he wanted, and they seemed to leap forward as the Marine increased the magnification on his scope, and let the barrel drift slightly. Which life should he take? The one on the left with the blue armor? Or the one on the right, the shiny gold bastard? At that moment in time, in that particular place, Lance Corporal Jones was God.
He clicked the sniper rifle’s safety catch, and lightly rested his finger on the trigger.

• Halo The Flood, chapter 6

PART IV: THERE’ll BE ANOTHER TIME
New information that’s come to light regarding the operation comes from recent Halo Infinite Intel, about how Deep Winter had select Spartans pulled in secret ahead of PROMETHEUS.
Admittedly, this likely wouldn’t have drastically changed anything, but as John notes in Silent Storm, Spartan effectiveness is dramatically increased and heightened when at optimal team strength, and it seems Deep Winter pulled Spartans to make use of their individual skill sets, a cascading ripple occurs as teams would need to reshuffle and reorganize to fill in and make up to the gaps. The more Spartans removed, the less effective the Company will be, the less ground they can cover, and the greater chance of failure and death, noted here by John:

If the Spartans were attacking separate targets, they wouldn’t be able to support each other—and the efficiency of a Spartan team decreased exponentially each time a member was removed. Dr. Halsey estimated that a Spartan operating alone was only one-sixteenth as effective as a four-member team . . . and sixteen times as likely to get killed.

• Halo Silent Storm, chapter 5

As Kurt himself notes, Deep Winter often operated from a perspective of basic morality functions, which Kurt considered inadequate and a sort of weakness:

What could an AI possibly know what it was like on a real mission? Bullets zinging so close over your head that you didn't so much as hear them hut felt them pass. Or what it was like to get hit, but still have to keep going, bleeding, because if you didn't everyone on your team would die?

• Halo Ghosts of Onyx, chapter 9

Again, little likely changed, but the organizational hurdles and missing members might have effected how Alpha went about their mission, and how quickly they could have completed it.
Which leads us to our conclusion.
CONCLUSION
TLDR: Alpha Company faced a number of factors that led to their demise during Operation PROMETHEUS, and it wasn’t really due to a lack of training, or any sort of deficiency with the Spartans themselves, at least, not that we can see.
Instead, their deaths occurred due to stim-pack overdose, overwhelming enemy reinforcements, and difficult to maintain logistics hampered by additional, and unnecessary issues. While not technically a reason, the loss of select members saved by Deep Winter also probably had an effect on the Company’s overall performance,
In the end, the situation was doomed once the extraction craft were destroyed, and that only hastened Alpha Company’s demise. Kurt, despite his guilt, had nothing to be ashamed of, and their deaths couldn’t be placed on him or the others in the program. At the end of the day, Alpha Company died to factors outside their control and through no obvious faults of their own.
They may have died, cut off and alone, but they did what any Spartan would do, what any Spartan could do;
The impossible.
SUPPLEMENTAL/ADDITIONAL NOTES

• [1]: PROMETHEUS references the Greek God of the same name. A Titan who stole the fire of the gods and gave hope to humanity. In much the same way that Alpha Company gave hope to humanity by delaying the Covenant advance. Of course, this sacrifice went unknown by everyone. Interestingly, Alpha Company’s operations all involve fire in some way. PROMETHEUS has been explained. HWACHA refers to a Korean siege weapon from the 15th century, a cart with dozens of arrows/rockets that would be shot at a target, usually causing mass confusion and panic. Akin to a canister or grapeshot from a cannon. FIREBRAND doesn’t really need an explanation (but seeing as it was their most notable Anti-Insurrectionist operation…yikes, lol). While IRON GRAVE might seem out of place, it harkens back to Prometheus(the deity, not the operation) and his role as a smith. Iron needs to be forged into armour or tools, and based off the timeline, IRON GREAVE might have been Alpha’s first foray against the Covenant proper, hence, its akin to a baptismal experience, or a case of the Company being forged under fire.
  
• [2]: The Mythos artwork depicts a battlefield covered in smoke and ash, but from what I can see, the ground is more or less completely flat with very little deviation on terrain, this means Alpha would need to belly crawl until they arrived at one of the reactors to make best use of their PR systems, slowing them down significantly and, at the same time, meant that once combat was initiated, moving from Reactor Complex to Reactor Complex would have been both incredibly exposed and provided no cover.
  
• [3]: Mirage’s introduction to Infinte also introduces us to the AAP/K-ROC Ordinance Pack, an up-armoured cuirass noted to be cheap and easily available and intended to be worn by Mark I and II SPI. The overall shape makes it seem like it would have fit both Mythos depictions of SPI, and it’s almost certain everyone would have been wearing it, which would have mitigated some of the logistical issues. Assuming a Spartan needed only to replace this aspect of their armour, or their shoulder pauldrons were removed without compromising the rest of the suit’s stealth integrity, logistics issues might have been less of an issue. Other supplemental attachments, like RS/MOONGLOW, rather than entirely different helmets, would have also helped.
  
• [4]: I go into further detail of Spartan appearances and their differing looks (sort of) in this post
  

With that, we conclude another “essay”. Next up (timeline permitted) a character study and a look at love.
~ EternalCanadian

On December 15, 2021, I submitted my first Reddit post very worried about how the City's Planning Department was gaslighting the Cobble Hill Apartments community. To be honest, I found great support in seeing how many Somerville residents cared enough to comment. Thank you!
Since my posting, the Mayor completed her community “listening sessions” and formed a Citizen Advisory Committee to move ahead as planned. As an abutter with so much to lose, nothing really changed other than the Mayor is moving close to achieving a severely flawed vision for 90 Washington Street.
This represents my second Reddit posting. This time, I want to share with you a copy of an open letter I sent on behalf of Cobble Hill residents to each of the 11 Somerville City Councilor who will decide the fate of 90 Washington Street. In doing so, it is my hope the Somerville Reddit community will come to better understand the conflict and then support Cobble Hill by reaching out to your Councilors and let your thoughts be known in this election year.
Cobble Hill Apartments is not against the development of 90 Washington Street. We are against any new neighbor that is designed to create 2,263 annual emergency sirens along with any plan that plows under our green space, cuts down 84 mature trees, and takes away our parking lot and alleyway to our trash dumpster.
I imagine every Ward 1 resident would be very concerned about the loss of Cobble Hill’s biggest parking lot at 74 Washington Street, which the city took by eminent domain for private development. Without this parking lot, three dozen Cobble Hill residents and visitors will need to forage for parking on public streets where parking is already extremely limited. Look out Franklin St., Myrtle St., Oliver Ave., & Florence St.!
If you have a soft spot for 300 low-income elders, you probably also care about what happens when parking availability is removed for homecare, visiting nurses and family guests. Separately, if you worry about the responsible distribution of finite government resources, you should be horrified by the new $102 million price tag to build a public safety building when the 2019 approvals were based on a projection half that expense. And if you care about urban planning issues around public transportation portals, you likely think putting a public safety building with a multi-story 200-unit parking garage next to a new GLX subway stop is a really terrible idea.
For most Somerville residents, there is plenty to dislike if you expect government transparency and an honest community process. We should all be upset by the false justifications that were provided in both the 2018 Site Selection Study and the 2019 Demonstration Plan Project that chose 90 Washington Street. And lastly – because Green Initiatives always seem get the short end of the straw - if you care about Urban Green Space, why not preserve the green space and 84 mature trees that are to be plowed under if the city’s plans go forward.
The city’s plans don’t work for Cobble Hill. They don’t work for Ward 1. And they don’t work for Somerville.
My letter to Somerville's 11 City Counselors is as follows:
Dear Honorable Members of Somerville City Council:
It is our understanding Somerville City Council, not the former Mayor, not the Planning Department, and not the current Mayor, will be the final “decider” on the future of 90 Washington Street. With this in mind, I hope that each of you will vote against cutting down 84 mature trees, plowing under well-manicured green space, and removing a parcel of land that for 40-years has provided both resident parking and hauling access to Cobble Hill’s trash facility.
I have worked at Cobble Hill for 21 years and find it beyond belief city government removed quality of life assets from 300 affordable elders. I am not a public person, nor do I enjoy my new public role in defending Cobble Hill Apartments. That said, I find it more distasteful to do nothing when truly bad decisions are being made and Cobble Hill residents are in urgent need of advocacy.
And so, I first sought out advice from residents, co-workers and community activists to help me understand why this was happening. And as we chipped away at the untruths we were told by city officials; we responded each time with a letter writing campaign to report the facts. It has been exhaustive, but I believe we have completed everyone’s homework. Our hopes to stop this mistake from happening now rests with Somerville City Council.
Perhaps, it could be helpful to know 44% of Cobble Hill’s 224 units own a registered vehicle. When we lose our parking lot at 74 Washington Street, three dozen elderly households along with homecare workers, visiting nurses, and family members will need to play the cruel game of Ward 1 “musical cars” due to the immediate loss of off-street parking. I have yet to meet anyone who thinks Cobble Hill’s spillover parking requirements can be absorbed by street parking.
Currently, Cobble Hill’s parking is tight but workable. Absolutely nothing good will come from having Cobble Hill elders and their service providers compete for Ward 1’s severely limited street parking.
Likewise, you should be interested to know the alleyway behind 84 Washington Street was designed four decades ago to allow garbage truck removal of multiple two-yard trash receptacles and one large trash dumpster. The architect designed the dumpsters to be next to the building’s trash chute compactor room. If at any point garbage trucks lose access to the alleyway, the twice-a-week pick-up of compacted trash will no longer be possible because the bins are much too large to be rolled out any door other than the one that presents to the alleyway. And if this happens, I will need to permanently lock the hallway trash chutes at 84 Washington Street and instruct the 97 residents to dispose of their household trash in a perimeter dumpster outside the building.
This is not a small problem to be ignored as the average Cobble Hill senior is 75 years old and at varying stages of health and mobility. It is my experience the trash chutes conveniently located on every floor are difficult enough for many elders who struggle to live independently. Requiring frail seniors to use perimeter dumpsters is an unnecessary burden.
We now imagine the then-City Council voted for the Demonstration Plan Project without a full understanding of these consequences. Given how much Cobble Hill has been gaslighted in our cry for advocacy, we suspect the Planning Department failed to tell City Council these collateral hardships as well. Indeed, how else would any City Counselor have known these details because there was not one public hearing about the land-taking before the City Council vote.
As disturbing, the alleyway behind 84 Washington Street is frequently used for a more convenient vehicular drop-off when seniors return from shopping or when they ambulate with walkers. This makes sense of course because it is the closest point of access as the building’s front entrance is set back considerably from the street requiring more mobility. The routine requirements of life will be more difficult for seniors when this building access point is needlessly taken away.
These examples of unjustifiable hardship are the causal effects of poor decision making. They are also infuriating because they were created by the former mayor’s overreach without public input. Cobble Hill’s legitimate concerns were easily anticipated, easily prevented, and sadly just as easily ignored.
Absent a public community process, the Planning Department wasn’t asked to explain how the taking of these assets might diminish Cobble Hill Apartment’s quality of life. Nor were Planning Department officials ever asked if all four of the acres they took qualified as “blight”. They were not! Instead, Cobble Hill Apartments discovered a much darker lesson about Somerville’s “community process”. If facts and public scrutiny prove inconvenient, they are to be circumvented. And when facts do not align with the Planning Department’s narrative and/or the deeply flawed Site Selection Study and equally flawed Demonstration Plan Project, it is best to ignore them altogether and keep moving forward. How else to explain no written responses to Cobble Hill’s letters and the absence of our expressed concerns on the https://voice.somervillema.gov/90washington redevelopment website?
To say the City’s outreach to date has been dismissive, insensitive, and anti-community is prologue. So much so it is reasonable to wonder if the Planning Department made the cold calculation that Cobble Hill is comprised of low-income residents who are powerless to stop them. Whatever the truth, I would wager Cobble Hill’s now endangered “quality of life” that nothing so bold would have occurred if Cobble Hill Apartments were a high-end market rental or homeowner community.
Fortunately, it is not too late. The Administration’s request for bond funding requires City Council approval. We respectfully and urgently ask you to vote no. Voting against this request should not be hard. The 2018 Site Selection Study and the 2019 Demonstration Plan Project made clear the proposed Public Safety Building required a land parcel no larger than 30,000 sq ft with a projected construction cost of between $36 and $48.5 million. Inexplicably, this grandiose plan has since been put on steroids. City Council is now being asked to approve a previously unimaginable price tag of $102 million to include a land parcel almost five times the size of the need that was projected. This amount will very likely climb once again when the pro tanto stage of the land value dispute is resolved.
Now is the time for City Council to show awareness and fiduciary responsibility. The original plans for 90 Washington Street were poorly justified and should not have been predicated on the taking of quality-of-life assets from low-income elders. We ask instead for City Council to adopt Councilor McLaughlin’s promise to Cobble Hill residents that no parking or alleyway will be taken, and the green space and trees will be preserved.
In addition, at the core of our public dispute is whether 90 Washington Street is the very best location for the City’s new Public Safety Building. It is not. The vacant lot at 90 Washington Street is steps from a MBTA GLX subway stop that should be destined for far better purposes than an upgraded police & fire building. We believe 90 Washington Street could inspire a new hub of activity on a rare and immensely valuable parcel next to a subway stop.
On the contrary, proposing a Public Safety Building for 90 Washington Street might be the very worst idea as it will forevermore disturb a community of 300 elders with 2,262 annual siren alarms. Unlike our neighbors who go to school and/or work and spend weekends away from home, Cobble Hill residents are largely homebound 24/7 and will hear every one of the sirens as they wail their way each day and night through heavy traffic on Washington St. It is our firm belief that building a siren producing “noise machine” next to Cobble Hill Apartments is a very bad fit. The following link is a compilation of protest letters written by residents, and emails I have distributed that define why Cobble Hill Apartments is so upset with the City’s plans.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/gnxi1te1ril2yv7/2023-03-07%20-%20Cobble%20Hill%20views%20on%2090%20WS.pdf?dl=0
Please let us know what more we can do to save our quality of life, and to support Somerville with better options. We are counting on you, and again ask that you vote against authorizing this plan to move forward.
Respectfully,
Evelyn Ortiz
Property Administrator Cobble Hill Apartments

Looking for one with preferably a deep note

So I read around on forums, and here on reddit, to find that a lot of people with TUF Gaming were having issues with the Wifi cards. I had seen people claim to fix it by upgrading to the Intel Wifi-6 AX200 160 MHz card. So I decided to try that after exhausting every other fix. It worked for a month or so without a single issue, but now it's even worse, and this time I'm getting a switch off between the Bluetooth and Wifi dropping out. Code 10, Code 45 all of it. Sometimes the Wifi will drop out for a few seconds and come back, sometimes it will be gone until I restart or run a network reset. Sometimes multiple restarts before wifi is working. The functionality will completely disappear to the point where the bluetooth or wifi, or both at once, will completely disappear from the device manager.
Anyone find a good fix for this? I'm running Windows 10. I've tried reinstalling drivers, clean install of drivers, resetting bios, etc. As I'm typing this, I have wifi, but bluetooth is completely gone. It was working 15 minutes ago but now my device manager doesn't even show that I have bluetooth functionality. Thanks in advance.
Edit: I did have a weird thing happen a few months ago before the first time this happened, where I opened the laptop to the blue screen saying windows had to do a clean install. I think my problems started after that.
Edit 2: I just went into device manager and noticed that there was a code 10 on a random unknown usb device. When I disabled and enabled that it disappeared from the universal serial bus tree and the bluetooth tree reappeared. Bluetooth is working now. Weird.

I've been thinking of upgrading from my TV speakers and have been searching for good used deals in my local listings. At first, I was going the home theater route but the search became exhausting and I decided I could probably get away with a mid range soundbar in my small apartment for now.
Can anyone help me pick the best sound for my buck among these choices I've been considering from my local listings?
LG SL9YG with sub and 2 rear speakers. Going for $250 or best offer. Thoughts: Not sure how much it not having eARC is bad. Looks like it was recently reduced from $300 OBO to $250 OBO.
Vizio SB36512-F6 for $200. Thoughts: Also includes subwoofer and 2 surround speakers. I like the price, but once again, don't think it has eARC either.
Samsung HW-Q70T for $265 Thoughts: i think this is newer than the ones above so should have eARC now. Only comes with a subwoofer, though.
Bose Smart Soundbar 600 + Bose Subwoofer Module 500 for $650 Also found Bose Smart Soundbar 600 for $300 Thoughts: These seem the newest and the most tempting, especially the latter deal. Plus I've seen a lot of talk on here about the Bose Soundbar 600, so I'm guessing it's good. Should I jump on this ASAP?
Any advice would be appreciated. Should I grab the newer soundbar at the bottom, or grab one of the older models above with the additional accessories, maybe even try to negotiate those for less? Not sure how much the sound has improved year to year or how important eARC capability is. Thanks!

- Vision Wheels - Warrior - 20 x 9 - +18 off set
- Nitto Grappler Recon Tires - 285/55/20 - no rub
- Rough Country AT4 1.75" Leveling Kit
- S&B Filters Cold Air Intake
- MBRP Catback Exhaust - moderate
- WeatherTech Rain Guards
- Ronin Bullet Antenna
- Putco Tailgate Light Bar
- BakFlip TriFold Tonneau Cover
- GMC Tow Hitch Cover
- Starlight Headliner
- Black Emblem Overlays
- Tint - 35% windshield, 15% front, 15% over 5% back
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Stock - November 2022
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https://reddit.com/link/11zs5w7/video/cun2txiz2jpa1/player
Upgraded - March 2023

My motherboard died on my 5 year old prebuilt so I'm doing a partial upgrade of my mobo/cpu/psu and coming back to the GPU later.
Looking to have the following parts:
Case: Fractal Meshify 2 Compact -- comes with 3 front intake and one rear exhaust fan, all 120MM. By all accounts I've seen they're solid.
Processor: Intel i7 12700k
Cooler: AIO Liquid cooler, currently eyeballing a Kraken X53 240mm to top-mount
Mobo: MSI Pro Z790-P DDR4
GPU: GTX 1060, my old GPU that I'll upgrade later.
I'm fairly certain everything will fit together (might need to get some new low-profile RAM for clearance concerns with the cooler) but if I have my AIO running exhaust to prioritize case temp over CPU temp (planning ahead for a 4070 or similar GPU) I end up with 3 fans in and 3 fans out.
I've seen a lot of discussion on the merits of positive vs negative pressure, is there anything wrong with a neutral pressure? I haven't seen much talk in my searching but a buddy told me people felt very strongly about it when he built his last PC but was willing to admit "It was a big topic back when I was into it but like most things on the internet the importance was probably over exaggerated at the time."

This is my first foray into the Subaru world though not my first trip into the turbo 4 cyl awd world as my name might hint at. I've built a few dsm's, a z32 tt 300zx, svt cobra and s13 in the past. I always liked wrx's but knew myself well enough to know anything short of a STI wouldn't keep me happy for long. I picked up my current car off ebay right before covid shut everything down. 107k miles, intake, cat back, AP3 installed, supposedly low compression in 1 cylinder, $8k plus shipping from the west coast. The car showed up maybe a week before the initial covid shut downs took place. First start had smoke billowing out of the exhaust and what sounded like popcorn popping under the hood. I'm not completely inept when it comes to cars but i knew doing the motor was going to be more than i was prepared to tackle. Stopped at a few places while waiting for the car to arrive and was shocked at the costs i was being given to prep something to break 400 whp after a turbo upgrade down the road.
I ended up settling on a local place called Area1320 in Nazareth PA to do the work. They're the closest Subaru specialty shop and they're an IAG certified installer. I started collecting parts as i found deals on them as my date to go in for the build was still several months off. Unfortunately due to all the shut downs shipping delays and places just plain being out of stock meant what was supposed to be a 2-3 month long build turned into a 2 year build. Over this time as i kept doing research and finding deals on more parts the build just kept growing. It was always intend to be a full street car. Something responsive that is a joy to take on my favorite back roads and to the autocross when they come to town.
When they finally cracked into my motor it was pretty clear that there were more problems besides 1 cylinder with low compression. 1 piston had a cracked ring land. Another has the edge of the piston crown literally explode. Metal chunks damaged 1 head beyond repair, turbo was smoked and tons of oil in the tmic.
There isn't an area of the car that hasn't been touched at this point. To the best of my knowledge this list of parts below is accurate.
Turbo/Intake/Exhaust

• Boost Lab 54XR+ 66 lb/min turbo, 3” T51 inlet, .83 v-band ex. housing.
• 3” v-band downpipe w/ gesi cat
• Torque Solutions downpipe thermal blanket
• Custom air intake
• DEI turbo blanket
• Tomei ELH, SwainTech coated & gaskets
• Custom rotated up-pipe for v-band w/ 38mm external gate
• Up pipe blanket
• Tial MV-SBK 38mm external wastegate w/1 bar spring, routed into downpipe
• Full Race Tial heat blanket
• Custom resonated mid pipe
• ARK GRiP cat back exhaust
• ETS 4” FMIC w/ custom piping
• IAG 74mm throttle body
• Tial Q bov, black, 10 psi spring, burnt titanium hardware
• Radium dual injector TGV’s w/ 8mm phenolic lower gasket & hardware
• NA intake manifold port matched to tgv’s, wrinkle black
• Grimmspeed intake manifold to TGV gasket
• Torque Solutions 12mm exhaust mount kit
• Reflect-A-Gold high temp reflective tape
• Area1320 3 port EBCS

Sensors/Gauges

• Aem 5 bar map sensor w/ torque solutions bolt on adapter
• Plug-n-Play IAT sensospeed density kit
• AEM WBO2/Boost gauge combo w/ drivers side vent mount
• Innovate Motorsports 3913 MTX-D oil pressure/temp gauge kit
• Innovate Motorsports 3851 MTX-D boost/shift light gauge kit
• Cobb flex fuel kit
• Cobb fuel pressure sensor
• Cobb AP V3

Fuel

• IAG v3 fuel rails
• IAG braided fuel lines
• Injector Dynamics ID1700x injectors w/ plugs
• Radium Engineering dual pump fuel hanger w/ aem 50-1200 fuel pumps
• Radium Engineering fuel hanger dual pump plumbing kit
• iWire plug n play dual pump wiring harness
• Radium Engineering high flow fuel filter w/ 10 micron filter & 1pc heat exchange clamp
• Fragola 602008 -8 PTFE feed fuel line
• Fragola 602006 -6 PTFE return fuel line
• Fragola/Aeromotive AN fittings, ethanol safe
• AEM AFPR

Engine

• IAG Stage 2.5 short block w/ ½” head studs
• Headgames Motorworks pocket ported/assembled heads
• New OEM 11039AC070 right cylinder head casting
• New OEM 11063AB480 left cylinder head casting
• Brian Crower BC0600S valve springs & steel retainers
• GSC 2012-8 36mm in. valves
• GSC 2011-8 32mm ex. valves
• GSC OEM replacement valve seat set
• GSC 6mm valve guides
• Brian Crower BC2960 valve guide single groove stem keepers
• Brian Crower BC0623 cams
• Viton valve stem seals
• ATI 917991 super harmonic damper
• Torque Solutions secondary air pump block offs
• Company 23 EJ257 timing belt guide kit
• Perrin air oil separator
• IAG Stage 2 oil pump
• Aisin TKF-004 engine timing belt kit w/ new water pump
• ARP ½” head stud kit
• Group N mototrans mounts
• Pitch mount
• Mishimoto X-line radiator
• Perrin wrinkle black overflow tank
• Aluminati black expansion tank
• Mishimoto black silicone radiator hoses
• Mishimoto thermostat
• Mishimoto black battery tie down
• SuperStik black dipstick
• Dress Up Bolts titanium engine bay kit, black
• WC Lathe Werks burnt titanium oil fill cap
• WC Lathe Werks burnt titanium alternator cover
• WC Lathe Werks titanium radiator stays
• RK Titanium burnt titanium upper radiator pipe
• JD Customs windshield washer, brake reservoir & clutch reservoir burnt titanium caps

Drivetrain

• ACT T1S-S05-Mod-Twin 225 twin disc clutch kit w/ lightweight flywheel
• Driveshaft Shop SUSH9-C carbon fiber driveshaft w/ 10mm bolts
• 34110VA121 2015-2017 STI 13:1 quick ratio steering rack
• Torque Solutions transmission member bushings
• Torque Solutions positive shift kit
• Torque Solutions shifter linkage bushings
• Torque Solutions solid shifter linkage U-joint
• Torque Solutions clutch master cylinder brace
• Torque Solutions TS-SU-427BK billet rear differential brace
• Torque Solutions TS-SU-603 rear differential lockdown system
• Goodridge SS clutch line
• Goodridge SS brake lines
• Hawk HPS+ brake pads
• EBC slotted rotors
• Perrin PSP-BRK-401BK brake master cylinder brace
• ITS transmission pedal support bracket
• Arp 100-7727 wheel stud kits
• Mishimoto black aluminum wheel lugs w/ locks
• SSTI burnt titanium wheel lugs
• DarkMatterX DM-1 Shifter assembly
• 18 x 9.5 Enkei RPF1’s, 38mm offset
• 255/40 Michelin Pilot Sport A/S 4’s
• 8mm wheel spacers

Suspension

• Tein VSSB02-D1SS4 Flex A coilovers
• Tein EDK04-Q0349 edfc active pro controller
• Tein EDK05-12140 edfc motor kit
• Tein EDK06-K4474 strut kit
• Tein EDK07-P8022 edfc active gps kit
• Swift 7k front & rear springs
• Eibach front & rear sway bars w/ poly bushings
• Whiteline rear sway bar bracing
• Torque Solution front & rear end links
• Torque Solutions steering rack brace
• Whiteline KSR207 rack & pinion poly bushings
• Whiteline KCA425 control arm lower inner rear bushings
• Whiteline KCA334 control arm anti lift kit/lower inner rear bushings
• Whiteline W0506 front control arm bushings
• Whiteline KDT902 cross member bushings
• Whiteline W63394 control arm bushing
• Whiteline WEC081 rear essentials vehicle kit
  • KCA326 rear camber adjustment bushings
  • KDT905 rear differential power positive front kit
  • KDT906 rear differential positive power kit
  • KDT907 rear subframe positive traction kit
  • W0568 rear trailing arm front bushings
• Whiteline KDT903 rear differential mount bushings
• Whiteline KBR14 front control arm brace
• Whiteline KBR15 rear sway bar brace
• Whiteline KBR16 rear sway bar brace, link support
• Whiteline W0568 rear trailing arm bushings
• Whiteline W63225 rear control arm bushing
• Whiteline W0508 front control arm lower inner bushings
• Whiteline W53353 front control arm lower inner rear bushings
• Whiteline W63412 rear control arm upper outer bushings
• Whiteline KCA313 roll centebump steer correction kit
• Whiteline KTA147B rear toe arm
• Whiteline KTA216A rear lower control arms
• Megan Racing front lower 'H' brace
• Cusco 692-492-FM front member brace
• Cusco 687-492-RS floor rear side braces
• Cusco 692-49-RM rear member brace
• Cusco 692-492-R rear floor brace
• Cusco 692-492-M front cross member
• Ultra Racing UR-SD8-1337 8 pt side lower brace
• Ultra Racing UR-ML4-1336p 4 pt mid lower brace
• Kein KSUB026 fender reinforcement braces
• SPT SOA8431130 front strut tower bar
• Megan MR-SB-SI08RU1P rear strut tower bar

Exterior

• CF front lip
• Seibon CF hood
• CF Varis hood struts for JDM aluminum hood
• RPG CF bumper vents
• CF side skirt extensions
• CF wing extension
• GoGoCarbon rear tailgate garnish
• CF b/c pillars
• Seibon cf front fenders
• Valenti red/clear jeweled tail lights
• Torque solutions billet tpms valve stem kit, black
• WC Lathe Works burnt titanium fender badges

Interior

• WC Lathe Werks burnt titanium shift knob
• WC Lathe Werks burnt titanium SI drive cover
• SSCO wrinkle black aluminum reverse lockout
• SSCO burnt titanium e-brake button
• SSCO perforated black leather shift boot w/ red stitching
• SSCO perforated black leather e-brake boot w/ red stitching
• SSCO black leather armrest cover w/ red stitching
• OEM pop up arm rest
• GoGoCarbon D shaped steering wheel
• SMY dual gauge pod cluster surround
• Intertek Fabrications CF dash/vent/door handle trim, shifter surround & window switch panels
• JDMuscle CF center console cover
• Alpine Type R 6.5” speakers
• Idoing android head unit

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Looking to upgrade my exhaust on my 1st gen ILX 6MT. I'm posting here giving that our cars are similar and most performance parts are interchangeable, and the ILX sub seems to be really small, makes me susp that the manual owners are a rare breed.
Anyway, not sure if I should do a catback or just an axleback. And what brands are the best sounding too. Pricing would also play a role, because if an axle back is just a few bucks less than a catback, then might as well get the cat back.

Ok ladies and gents want your input. I have a 2009 fz6r. Love the bike, everything about it. It's stock save for some bars, power commander and full two brothers exhaust. And some other knick knacks, frame guards, pegs ect.. So, I feel as though I'd like some more umph get up and go power. Now I've had this thing screaming doing 140. But it takes it a hot freaking minute to get there lol. My hypothetical is can a same generation fuel injected r6 engine fit in my bike? I've heard the get an r6 argument. But honestly I dunno that I could. Between the back problems made worse by the aggressive position and my ass feeling like it's on a piece of wood I almost feel like I wouldn't be able to stand it. But with the way my fz6r is set up I've ridden it all day and not felt any pain. Are there any other performance upgrades I could make that wouldn't destroy this stupid reliable and long lasting engine? Or is this r6 swap possible with an engine, fuel system, Guage cluster, wiring harness switch, or is it way more complicated? Anyone ever done it before?

Welcome to the DAT, summoner! Post questions regarding team composition, content progression, game mechanics, or anything else in this thread. If you are able to help your fellow summoners, please take some time to contribute to the community and answer some questions yourself as well!
A lot of helpful guides and resources can be found in the subreddit mega wiki.

If you ask a question please give ALL relevant information!

• Your monster box: Upload a screenshot to Reddit directly or an image hosting site like imgur or use swarfarm. Sort your box by "Grade" and try to include all 4*s and LD nat 3*s.
• Your current progression: Where you currently are in the game, what your teams are, what content you need help with and what you have tried so far.
• For ToA, which enemies are on the floor you're stuck on.
• For PvP, indicate what rank you are trying to achieve, i.e. currently F3 want to get C1 Arena. For RTA also share your rank percentage.

The less people have to clarify or look up to help you, the more likely you will get a fast response.

Beginner friendly/farmable PvE teams

Recommended progression: GB10 -> ToAN -> GB12 -> ToAH -> (DB11 ->) NB12 -> R5 and Rifts
Fast progression: GB12 -> (DB11 ->) NB12 -> BJ5 -> Tricaru DB12
Note that for NB12 a few violent sets (especially on twins) are making things a lot easier so before tackling Necropolis you might want to farm a little bit of DB11, it also gives you Guard runes for Tricaru.

• GB10: Vero (L), Fran, Loren, Lapis, Shannon/second awakened (2A) Kro
• Legacy GB10 teams typically include Belladeon, Bernard, or Darion. These units are outdated and can be skipped.
• GB12: Vero (L), Fran, Loren, 2A Kro, Shannon/Lapis/2A Naomi
• DB12: Verde (L), Fran, Loren, Sig, Elsharion or Verde (L), Vero, Fran, Loren, Spectra (2A)
• PB10: Verde (L), Colleen/Fran, 2A Raoq, 2A Kro, 2A Spectra/Yen/Pang. You can also use 2A Jultan to tank the boss (on multiple Will sets).
• SB10: Fran, Loren, 2A Kro, 2A Raoq, Ling Ling
• NB12: Lapis (L), Colleen/Fran, Loren, 2A Raoq, 2A Kro/Raoq (NB10 guide). Twins are a much better choice and should be used if possible. You can also directly use Tricaru.
• ToA(H): Fran (L), Lapis, Verde, Loren, Vero/2A Kro/2A Spectra. Use Tyron if you have him. 2A Sath/Thrain are good options if you want to go for a dot team, do not use Baretta as he's terribly outdated.
• R5: Front Line: Xiong Fei, Darion Back Line: Colleen, 2A Kro, Tesa, Theo/Xiao Lin/Belladeon
• R5 stat minimum: You need 25k HP and 1.5k DEF for FL units and 20k HP and 0.8-1k DEF for BL units. Healers and your cleanser should have 100% RES after lead.
• Rift unit options: Xiao Lin, Theomars, Fran, Colleen, and 2A Kro can be used in most of your rift teams. FL Mav/Bernard is good for Water rift and Lapis is good for Fire and Dark rifts. Twins are great in all rifts.

You still need appropriate rune quality and turn order! Do not expect to beat a dungeon just by having these units

Common speed teams

• R5 - BJ5: Colleen, Baleygr, Janssen, Dagora, Loren, lead unit (BJ5 guide)
  
• DB12 - Tricaru: Verde (L), 2A Icaru, 2A Icaru, 2A Icaru (guide (Note: DEF requirement is 3300)) (Cheatsheet) (Calculator)
  
• NB12 - Tricaru: Either add Astar or replace Verde with her (on vamp, same stats). Adding Astar and Lushen to clear waves first also works.
  
• GB12 - dots dots dots: 2A Sath, Mellia, Mellia, 2A Tatu, dot unit/Lushen (guide)
  
• PB10 - Tricaru: Kill towers first (usually L>R>B but some people reported R>L>B working better for them).
  
• SB10 - dots dots dots: 2A Sath, Mellia, Mellia, 2A Tatu, dot unit/Lushen
  

PvE accuracy requirements

Rifts need no ACC. R5 needs 15%. SB10 needs 25%. PB10 39%. ToA(H), GB10, and NB10 45%. DB10, GB12, NB12 and ToA Hell 55%. DB12 needs 65%.

General tips and answers to Frequently Asked Questions:

• NEVER feed non-farmable monsters! (you can feed dupes for skill ups)
• Save your devilmons! In general you do not want to give devilmon to 4* units, Sigmarus and Jeanne are the best early game candidates. Veromos does not need devilmon.
• Best summon stone targets: Tyron, Lushen, Shaina, Sabrina, Talia. For PvP Khmun, Skogul, Galleon.
• Check the events for free energy, mana, and other beneficial stuff. To find the current event pages use the button below the energy/mana counter in-game.
• Lapis can farm Faimon Hell on the free 6* level 15 vampire/revenge runes provided by the challenges. She should be your first 5* and probably 6* as well.
• Shield sets can reduce the HP/DEF requirements on other units and multiple shield sets will stack to form one larger total shield. Each set contributes a shield equal to 15% of the base HP of the monster they are equipped on.
• White artifacts from B2 are cheap to upgrade and can give you a massive stat boost early.
• Hall of Heroes (HoH) should be attempted as high as you can climb. Reps like Rica or Verad can help a lot. Mid/late game players can get 5 extra copies of the HoH monster using almighty scroll pieces after each floor at the small cost of 2000 guild points for each extra monster.
• Most nat 5*s are PvP exclusive and should be set aside in storage till you make some progress on PvE. Some exceptions are CC units like Rica for ToA, cleansers like Anavel for starter R5, and Perna for rifts.
• Dimensional hole energy should be spent as soon as possible, always try to stay under the energy cap (recharge rate: 1 per 2h). 2A Kro first, then Spectra or Raoq.
• Need advice on RTA? Check this post first
• Looking for ToA Hell guidance? Take a look at this FAQ post.
• Swarfarm provides a bestiary for monster stats and data logs.

For more information please check out the more exhaustive FAQ.
If you see someone using monster icons, you can learn how to use them yourself: https://www.reddit.com/summonerswawiki/icons .
To set your user flair please visit the Reddit website (do not use the mobile app) and edit it there (example picture).